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Venable LLP. David
Gamage is a professor
of law at Indiana
University Maurer
School of Law. This
article represents the
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necessarily represent the views or professional
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In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors examine whether statelevel taxes on digital advertising — like
Maryland’s new tax — are barred by the
Internet Tax Freedom Act and discuss how the
act’s prohibition against “discriminatory” taxes
on electronic commerce should be construed
narrowly.

The Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA),1 enacted
as a temporary measure in 1998, then extended
eight times as a temporary provision, and finally
made permanent in 2016, prevents states and
localities from taxing internet access or imposing
“multiple or discriminatory” taxes on electronic
commerce. The pandemic has accelerated the
already rapid growth of the digital economy and
digital advertising, and it stands to reason that
state revenue systems should adapt to this shift.
One type of shift is to include digital goods
and services within a state’s sales tax base, and
another is to design new taxes that reflect the new
economy. Maryland recently adopted both kinds
of changes. The expansion of its sales tax to digital
goods has been seen as good policy that raises no
federal constitutional issues. By contrast,
Maryland’s adoption of a new tax structure — a
new tax on digital advertising — has attracted
intense criticism and a lawsuit.
The strongest legal claim against Maryland’s
new tax is a preemption argument under the
ITFA, which we will address here. In short, we
will argue that the preemption argument based on
the ITFA’s prohibition on levying so-called
discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce is
too facile; there is a strong argument on the other
side. Further, if there are two reasonable
interpretations of the ITFA’s scope, the narrower
interpretation that would not preempt the
Maryland law is supported by a battery of
constitutional canons. Given the novelty of the
issue, we are not confident that the Maryland tax
will eventually be upheld on the merits. However,

1

P. L. 105-277, Tit. XI, 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998), as amended by P.L.
107-75, section 2, 115 Stat. 703 (2001); P.L. 108-435, sections 2-6A, 118 Stat.
2615-2618 (2004); P.L. 110-108, sections 2-6, 121 Stat. 1024-1026 (2007); P.L.
113-235, Tit. VI, section 624, 128 Stat. 2377 (2014); P.L. 114-125, Tit. IX,
section 922, 130 Stat. 281 (2016) (codified at 47 U.S.C. section 151 note).
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we can say with confidence that this is a much
harder case than many have suggested.
Short Background of the ITFA
The ITFA prohibits states and localities from
levying “taxes on Internet access, or multiple or
discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.”2
ITFA proponents initially justified the
moratorium as a means of protecting the growth
of the nascent internet economy and allowing
states and localities to develop uniform,
coordinated definitions regarding taxes on
internet access and electronic commerce, rather
3
than a permanent ban. Over time, those same
supporters justified the ban as necessary to
encourage household adoption of internet access.4
Proponents expressed concern that allowing
states and localities to tax internet access would
hinder efforts to close the gap in the rates at which
high- and low-income households access the
5
internet, often referred to as the “digital divide.”
At the origin of the ITFA, approximately 30
percent of the U.S. population accessed the
6
internet. Internet sales in 1997 (the year before
enactment of the ITFA) were estimated to be $8
billion.7 Today, nearly 90 percent of the U.S.
population has access to the internet, and online

2

8

sales were estimated at more than $860 billion.
Digital advertising, a $900 million market in 1997,9
10
is projected to exceed $150 billion in 2021.
Maryland’s Tax on Digital Advertising
Maryland’s tax applies to annual gross
revenue derived from digital advertising in the
11
state. Only taxpayers with at least $1 million of
annual gross revenue derived from digital
advertising services in Maryland and $100 million
of global annual gross revenue are subject to the
12
tax. The tax is levied at scaled rates starting at 2.5
percent for taxpayers with global annual gross
revenues of $100 million through $1 billion and
rising to 10 percent for taxpayers with global
annual gross revenues exceeding $15 billion.13
Maryland does not levy sales tax or gross receipts
14
tax on the sale of print advertising services.
The ITFA and Maryland’s Tax
The plaintiffs make two arguments based on
the ITFA and many more based on the U.S.
Constitution. We will focus here on what we take
to be the plaintiffs’ strongest claim:
The Act imposes a charge on digital
advertising delivered over the internet
without applying a similar charge to nondigital advertising. Thus, the Act’s charge
is unlawfully “discriminatory” within the
15
meaning of ITFA.

47 U.S.C. section 151, note section 1101(a)(1), (2).

3

H.R. Rep. No. 105-808, at 12 (1998) (referring to the three-year
moratorium as a “time out” and calling for the commission created in
the ITFA to generate legislative proposals addressing taxation of the
internet); S. Rep. No. 105276, at 4-5 (1998) (“fair and administrable rules
for taxing and regulating the use of the Internet . . . should be
developed”); see also 143 Cong. Rec. S2282-83 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1997),
statement of Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore.: “The purpose of the bill I am
introducing today . . . is to allow everyone to stand back and take a deep
breath. It says let’s suspend this crazy tax quilting bee so that everyone
can come together in a rational way to figure out what policy makes the
most sense.” The internet access provider members of the resulting
Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce did not offer any
proposals, and instead voted to recommend a permanent ban on
taxation of internet access.
4

A 2006 Government Accountability Office study found no evidence
that state and local taxes had a significant impact on household internet
access. See GAO, “Broadband Deployment Is Extensive Throughout the
United States, but It Is Difficult to Assess the Extent of Deployment Gaps
in Rural Areas,” GAO-06-426, at 21-22, 31-32, and Appendix III (May
2006). Donald Bruce, John Deskins, and William F. Fox, “Has Internet
Access Taxation Affected Internet Use?” 32(2) Pub. Fin. Rev. 131, 145
(2004).
5

See Jeffrey M. Stupak, “The Internet Tax Freedom Act: In Brief,”
Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress R43772 (Oct. 5,
2015).
6

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Internet Users for the United
States” (last updated Dec. 17, 2020).
7

Wendy R. Liebowitz, “Taxman Has Interest in Internet Biz,” Nat’l L.
J. (Mar. 16, 1998).
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All definitions of discrimination in the law
require that a tax be imposed on internet activities
but not “similar property, goods, services, or
information accomplished through other

8

Fareeha Ali, “U.S. E-Commerce Grows 44.0% in 2020,” Digital
Commerce 360, Jan. 29, 2021.
9

Interactive Advertising Bureau, “Internet Advertising Sees
Breakthrough Year in 1997,” Apr. 6, 1998.
10
11
12
13

Statista, “Digital Advertising — United States.”
Md. Code Ann. Tax-Gen. section 7.5-102(a).
Md. Code Ann. Tax-Gen. section 7.5-201.
Md. Code Ann. Tax-Gen. section 7.5-103.

14

Md. Regs. Code section 03.06.01.38(A)(1). Baltimore City levies an
excise tax on off-site billboard advertising. This tax, 90 percent of which
was borne by Clear Channel, was recently upheld by the Maryland
Court of Appeals against a First Amendment challenge. See Clear Channel
Outdoor Inc. v. Director, Department of Finance of Baltimore City No. 9,
September Term 2020 (Mar. 15, 2021).
15

Chamber of Commerce v. Franchot, No. 1:21-cv-410, complaint para. 76
(D. Md. 2021).
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16

means.” And, to be sure, the Maryland tax is
imposed on digital advertising and not, say,
advertising in a newspaper. So end of story?
We think not. One might reasonably conclude
that digital advertising is very different from
regular print advertising and that the courts
should — and surely sometimes do — look
beyond mere labels. And one need only look at
the beginning of the complaint to see how
different digital advertising is from print
advertising. The plaintiffs argue that the digital
services tax is not a tax at all, but a penalty levied
to control the special externalities caused by
technology companies that earn billions of dollars
through digital advertising. In particular, the
argument goes, the targeted nature of these ads
ties earning revenue to giving more of what a
perceived consumer wants — often in ways that
are pernicious to public discourse.17 A static
advertisement in the local paper is seen by
everyone and so must be careful, but an ad
targeted to true believers need not be, and indeed
will generate more views the more it stokes their
prejudices.
It is beyond the scope of this article to fully
evaluate these plausible claims as to the
18
difference between digital and print ads, but the
point is that the plaintiffs think that arguing that
digital ads cause a distinct harm to be
sufficiently plausible such that they are asking

16

47 U.S.C. section 151, note section 1105(2)(A)(i), (ii), (iii).

17

This particular argument in favor of a tax on digital advertising was
made particularly forcefully by economist Paul Roemer. See Roemer, “A
Tax That Could Fix Big Tech,” The New York Times, May 6, 2019. As the
complaint notes, Romer testified in favor of the Maryland bill. See
Complaint para. 40. Note that there are other rationales to consider
digital taxes. For an argument that such taxes are a kind of consumption
tax, see Young Ran (Christine) Kim, “Digital Services Tax: A CrossBorder Variation of the Consumption Tax Debate,” 72 Alabama Law Rev.
131 (2020). For a tax that relies more on an income tax rationale, see Omri
Y. Marian, “Taxing Data” (Feb. 26, 2021).

the court to treat Maryland’s tax as not a tax at all
for purposes of the Tax Injunction Act.19 And
state courts have endorsed similar reasoning in
upholding state tax laws against an ITFA
challenge. In Labell,20 an Illinois appellate court
ruled that Chicago’s “Netflix tax” on video
streaming services was not a discriminatory tax
because there were no comparable services that
21
did not involve electronic commerce. In Gartner,
the taxpayer argued that levying retail sales tax
on subscriptions to its online research library
constituted a discriminatory tax under the ITFA
because the retail sales tax did not apply to
research reports delivered by mail or CD. The
Washington Court of Appeals rejected this
argument, stating that selling access to an online
research library is distinguishable from
delivering research content in hard copy or via
email because the library access involves
software applications.22
The plaintiffs undoubtedly have responses,
though we do think on balance that the stronger
argument is that the plain meaning of the ITFA
does not preempt Maryland’s tax. Our primary
point here is to illustrate that there is an
interaction between the statutory argument and
constitutional concerns that have been raised
about the ITFA.
Let’s suppose that the maximalist reading of
the plaintiffs is the better one. What then?
Presumably just avoiding the word
“advertising” will not save a state tax, but any
state tax on internet activity with a plausible
non-digital analogue that is taxed not at all or
differently or less would be preempted.
In short, we think that if the ITFA’s
prohibition on discriminatory taxes is
interpreted so broadly that it threatens to
preempt states’ authority to tax a large and
growing area of commerce, then the ITFA is itself

18

On the one hand, there are Supreme Court cases that interpret the
need for similarly situated comparators narrowly for purposes of the
dormant commerce clause — see, e.g., United Haulers Association v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330 (2007).
But there are also cases that arguably interpret the need for similarly
situated comparators more broadly. See Alabama Department of Revenue v.
CSX Transportation Inc., 575 U.S. 21, 28 (2015). Note that even CSX is
hardly unambiguously good news for preemption proponents because it
found that motor carriers were a fair comparator with railroads. As we
explained, it is not clear that this would be an accurate description of the
relationship between digital ads and print ads. Andrew D. Appleby
makes a similar point about the potentially important difference
between print and digital ads, though admittedly he is more skeptical of
the Maryland law on other grounds. Appleby, “Subnational Digital
Services Taxation,” 81 Maryland Law Rev. (Mar. 23, 2021).

19

And for the record, we do not think this is a good argument. At
most, all that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff shows is that this is a
Pigouvian tax — that is, a tax on a negative externality. If the plaintiffs
are right, then they can also enjoin, say, tobacco taxes.
20

Labell v. City of Chicago, 147 N.E.3d 732 (2019), petition for leave to
appeal denied, 144 N.E.3d 1175 (Ill. 2020).
21
22

Gartner Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 455 P.3d 1179 (Wash. 2020).
Id. at 1192.
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constitutionally suspect. Commentators now
point to Murphy v. NCAA23 as possibly
24
endangering the ITFA, but before we get to that
difficult case, we should review the state of the
law before Murphy.
State Taxing Power and the Presumption
Against Preemption
There is a strong argument — associated
with Michael T. Fatale — that Congress’s power
under the commerce clause to preempt state
taxing authority is much more limited than is
commonly supposed because those limitations
on the state taxing power are not sufficiently
25
related to interstate commerce. Two of us have
argued that this interpretation is too limiting,
and that the better analysis is that Congress can
limit state power over a much wider area, but not
in a manner that would go too far.26
There has been little need to decipher the
right analytic rubric because congressional
preemption of state taxing power has to date
27
been relatively rare and narrow. Further, there
is a presumption against preemption that the
U.S. Supreme Court seems to apply with
particular rigor in connection with the state
28
taxing power. The Court applied this

23

138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).

24

See, e.g., Daniel Hemel, “Justice Alito, State Tax Hero?” Medium,
May 15, 2018.
25

Michael T. Fatale, “Common Sense: Implicit Constitutional
Limitations on Congressional Preemptions of State Tax,” 2012 Mich. St.
L. Rev. 41 (2012).
26

David Gamage and Darien Shanske, “The Federal Government’s
Power to Restrict State Taxation,” State Tax Notes, Aug. 15, 2016, p. 547.
27

For example, federal legislation sets uniform nationwide sourcing
rules for state and local taxation of wireless services. See the Mobile
Telecommunications Sourcing Act, P.L. 106-252, section 116, 114 Stat. 626
(2000). Federal legislation also prohibits a state from taxing the
retirement income of an individual who is not a resident or domiciliary
of the state. See P.L. 104-95, 4 U.S.C. section 114. The 1975 amendments to
the Securities Act limit states’ power to levy stock transfer taxes. See P.L.
94-29, 15 U.S.C. section 78bb(d), 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
28

See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
(“We start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”). See also California State Board
of Equalization v. Sierra Summit Inc., 490 U.S. 844, 851-852 (1989)
(“Although Congress can confer an immunity from state taxation, we
have stated that [a] court must proceed carefully when asked to
recognize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not
clearly expressed. . . .”) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted); see also Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias
Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 48, 50 (2008) (following Sierra Summit). For further
discussion, see Shanske, “States Can and Should Respond Strategically
to Federal Tax Law,” 45 Ohio N. L. Rev. 543 (2019).
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presumption in connection with P.L. 86-272, the
largest congressional intrusion into state taxing
29
power, and the lower courts have followed its
30
lead. At least one lower court applied this
presumption to the ITFA to limit the scope of the
31
term “discriminatory.”
Thus, even before Murphy, there would be
good reason for courts to put a thumb on the scale
of interpretations that narrowly construe
congressional preemption of state taxing
authority.
Murphy and the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
Almost immediately after it was issued,
commentators noted that the Supreme Court’s
32
decision in Murphy v. NCAA seemed to imply
that much of Congress’s preemption of state law
— including state tax laws — was itself
33
unconstitutional. Murphy expands on the
Court’s two principal cases analyzing the anti34
35
commandeering doctrine, New York and Printz.
New York and Printz conclude that the anticommandeering principle of the 10th
Amendment prohibits the federal government
from “commandeering” a state legislature or its
executive officials in service of a federal
regulatory program.
In contrast to New York and Printz, Murphy
did not involve a federal statute requiring the
states to take affirmative action; the federal statute
merely forbade states from taking specific action.
New Jersey repealed provisions of its laws
prohibiting sports gambling, a direct challenge to
a provision under the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (PASPA) that made it
“unlawful” for a state to authorize sports betting.
The Supreme Court concluded that PASPA’s

29

Heublein Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 409 U.S. 275, 281-82
(1972).
30

See, e.g., Disney Enterprises Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of State, 10
N.Y.3d 392, 403, 888 N.E.2d 1029, 1036 (2008) (“We begin our reading of
Public Law 86-272 with the presumption that Congress does not intend
to supplant state law.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
31
32
33
34
35

See Gartner, 455 P.3d at 1179.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1461.
See Hemel, supra note 24.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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prohibition on state authorization of sports
gambling violated the anti-commandeering
36
principle. The Court stated that the commerce
clause “confers upon Congress the power to
regulate individuals, not states.”37 It further
elaborated that the anticommandeering
principle prohibits Congress from issuing
“direct orders” to state legislatures.38 A
congressional prohibition on state-authorized
sports gambling “unequivocally dictates what a
state legislature may and may not do,” and is
thus an unconstitutional “direct order” to a state
39
legislature.
Though it seems from the passages and
reasoning cited above that Murphy would
undermine much congressional preemption,
including of state taxation, that is generally
40
thought not to be the case. Not only did the
Court’s decision offer examples of acceptable
41
preemption, but all the justices in Wayfair —
decided five weeks later in the same term —
thought Congress could (and should) preempt the
states and impose uniform rules as to use tax
collection. Somehow, according to Murphy,
Congress can regulate individuals but not states.
But it is unclear to us — and to many — how to
apply this distinction when Congress gives an
individual a right not to be regulated by a state,
which seems substantively hard to disentangle
from an order to a state legislature not to regulate
the individual.
Murphy’s opacity — and potential
importance — has unsurprisingly spurred a lot

36

Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1473.

37

Id. at 1477.

38

Id. at 1478.

39

Id.

40

For an example of a smart commentator asserting the consensus
but not working out our particular hard question, see Edward Hartnett,
“Distinguishing Permissible Preemption From Unconstitutional
Commandeering,” 96 Notre Dame L. Rev. 351, 376 (2020): “Sure, Congress
lacks the power to simply negate a state tax. But it continues to have the
power to regulate interstate commerce. And as part of the power to
regulate interstate commerce, it can give private parties a right to engage
in certain kinds of interstate commerce free from state regulation or
taxation.”
So the federal government cannot “simply” preempt a state tax but
could preempt a tax if Congress gave a private party the right not to be
taxed, but then can the federal government give a corporation the right
to engage in commerce without state corporate taxation? That would be
to negate a tax, and yet this would be to regulate interstate taxation by
giving a private party a right.
41

Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480.

of commentary as scholars try to decipher how
Murphy should apply going forward. We can’t go
through all the possible interpretations, but
Murphy certainly cannot somehow increase the
federal government’s power to preempt state
taxes. Hence we started with our baseline
understanding that federal preemption statutes
are to be interpreted narrowly. As to Murphy, we
would highlight the analysis of Dean Vikram
Amar in particular. Amar argues that Murphy is
best read as imposing a clarity requirement to
conditional preemption statutes. Note that the
ITFA, unlike PASPA, is not a conditional
preemption statute, and so arguably Murphy
then has no implication at all to our case. But it
might, as Amar explains:
Perhaps requiring Congress to express its
intent to preempt in unmistakable terms,
and also to define the scope of preemption
clearly, would make sense for preemption
settings more generally. But it would be a
rational first step for the Court to take to
harmonize conditional spending and
conditional preemption by requiring
particular clarity in both settings, where
the applicability of federal law will
depend on legislative choices states are
being encouraged — indeed invited — to
42
make.
Given the importance of state revenue
functions, we think reading Murphy to add a
requirement “to define the scope of preemption
clearly” is particularly apt. Thus, returning to the
reading of the ITFA apparently favored by the
plaintiffs, there are now (at least) three
background constitutional principles that render
it problematic. First, there is a presumption
against interpreting preemption statutes —
especially those relating to state taxes — broadly.
Second, if the ITFA does indeed preempt a broad

42

Vikram David Amar, “‘Clarifying’ Murphy’s Law: Did Something
Go Wrong in Reconciling Commandeering and Conditional Preemption
Doctrines?” 2018 Sup. Ct. Rev. 299, 319-320 (2018).
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— and vague — area of state taxation, then for
that reason the ITFA is vulnerable to challenge
43
based on Amar’s reading of Murphy. Third, and
precisely because the second issue is so difficult,
the canon of constitutional avoidance indicates
that a court should not interpret the ITFA in a
manner that could raise these difficult
constitutional questions.
Conclusion
The large and growing digital economy does
not function the same as the non-digital
economy. The Constitution should not prevent
states from imposing reasonable taxes on the
digital economy. The ITFA not only preempts
taxes on internet access, but also preempts states
if they tax similar transactions more heavily if
they are conducted over the internet. The classic
example would be taxing a purchase of shoes
more heavily over the internet than in a brickand-mortar store. We think it is quite reasonable
for the ITFA to do these two substantial things
and not much more. If the ITFA instead reaches
as far as the plaintiffs claim in the Maryland case,
then it represents a dramatic and uncertain
contraction of state taxing authority. There is
substantial doubt whether Congress could
achieve this result even if it clearly expressed its
intent to, but we don’t think Congress did so and,
thus, we think it did not.


43

One of us has argued that one can read Murphy as objecting to
Congress preempting too much with too little justification, a kind of
proportionality analysis. See Shanske, “Proportionality as Hidden (But
Emerging?) Touchstone of American Federalism: Reflections on the
Wayfair Decision,” 22 Chapman L. Rev. 73 (2019). This reading has an
upshot similar to Amar’s as to the ITFA: The broader the sweep of the
statute, the greater its constitutional vulnerability.
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